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Abstract. We study the two party problem of randomly selecting a string among
all the strings of length n. We want the protocol to have the property that the
output distribution has high entropy, even when one of the two parties is dishonest
and deviates from the protocol. We develop protocols that achieve high, close to
n, entropy.
In the literature the randomness guarantee is usually expressed as being close to
the uniform distribution or in terms of resiliency. The notion of entropy is not
directly comparable to that of resiliency, but we establish a connection between
the two that allows us to compare our protocols with the existing ones.
We construct an explicit protocol that yields entropy n − O(1) and has 4 log∗ n
rounds, improving over the protocol of Goldreich et al. [3] that also achieves
this entropy but needs O(n) rounds. Both these protocols need O(n2) bits of
communication.
Next we reduce the communication in our protocols. We show the existence, non-
explicitly, of a protocol that has 6 rounds, 2n + 8 logn bits of communication
and yields entropy n − O(logn) and min-entropy n/2 − O(logn). Our proto-
col achieves the same entropy bound as the recent, also non-explicit, protocol of
Gradwohl et al. [4], however achieves much higher min-entropy: n/2−O(logn)
versus O(logn).
Finally we exhibit very simple explicit protocols. We connect the security param-
eter of these geometric protocols with the well studied Kakeya problemmotivated
by harmonic analysis and analytical number theory. We are only able to prove
that these protocols have entropy 3n/4 but still n/2 − O(logn) min-entropy.
Therefore they do not perform as well with respect to the explicit constructions
of Gradwohl et al. [4] entropy-wise, but still have much better min-entropy. We
conjecture that these simple protocols achieve n − o(n) entropy. Our geometric
construction and its relation to the Kakeya problem follows a new and differ-
ent approach to the random selection problem than any of the previously known
protocols.
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1 Introduction
We study the following communication problem. Alice and Bob want to select a random
string. They are not at the same location so they do not see what the other player does.
They communicate messages according to some protocol and in the end they output a
string of n bits which is a function of the messages communicated. This string should
be as random as possible, in our case we measure the amount of randomness by the
entropy of the probability distribution that is generated by this protocol.
The messages they communicate may depend on random experiments the players
perform and on messages sent so far. The outcome of an experiment is known only to
the party which performs it so the other party cannot verify the outcome of such an
experiment or whether the experiment was carried out at all. One or both the parties
may deviate from the protocol and try to influence the selected string (cheat). We are
interested in the situation when a party honestly follows the protocol and wants to have
some guarantee that the selected string is indeed as random as possible. The measure of
randomness we use is the entropy of probability distribution that is the outcome of the
protocol.
In this paper we present protocols for this problem. In particular we show a proto-
col that achieves entropy n−O(1) if at least one party is honest and that uses 4 log∗ n
rounds and communicates n2+O(n log n) bits. The round complexity of our protocol is
optimal up-to a constant factor; the optimality follows from a result of Sanghvi and Vad-
han [8]. We further consider the question of reducing the communication complexity
of our protocols. We show non-constructively that there are protocols with linear com-
munication complexity that achieve entropy n− log n in just 3 rounds, and in 6 rounds
achieves in addition min-entropy n/2−O(log n)which is close to the optimal bound of
n/2, that follows from Goldreich et al. [3] and from a bound on quantum coin-flipping
due to Kitaev (see [2]). We propose several explicit and very simple protocols that have
entropy 3n/4 and we conjecture that they have entropy n− o(n). Our proofs establish
a connection between the security guarantee of our protocols and the well studied prob-
lem of Kakeya over finite fields motivated by Harmonic analysis and analytic number
theory (see [5, 6] for background information on Kakeya Problem). Although these con-
structive protocols do not achieve the same parameters as the best known constructive
protocols (see next section), our (geometric) protocols are quite different in nature and
much simpler to implement and still yield much higher min-entropy.
1.1 Previous work
There is a large body of previous work which considers the problem of random string
selection, and related problems such as a leader selection and fault-tolerant computa-
tion. We refer the reader to [8] for an overview of the literature. In this paper we assume
that both parties have unlimited computational power, i.e., so called full information
model. Several different measures for the randomness guarantee of the protocol are
used in the literature. The most widely used is the (µ, )-resilience and the statistical
distance from the uniform distribution. Informally a protocol is (µ, )-resilient if for
every set S ⊂ {0, 1}n with density µ (cardinality µ2n), the output of the protocol is
in S with probability at most . In this paper we study however another very natural
randomness guarantee, namely the entropy of the resulting output distribution. There is
a certain relationship between the entropy and resilience, but these parameters are not
interchangeable.
In [3], Goldreich et al. constructs a protocol that is (µ,
√
µ)-resilient for all µ > 0.
This protocol runs in O(n) rounds and communicates O(n2) bits. We show that their
security guarantee also implies entropy n − O(1). Hence, our first protocol, that uses
4 log∗ n is an improvement in the number of rounds with respect to the entropy measure
over that protocol.
Sanghvi and Vadhan [8] give a protocol for every constant δ > 0 that is (µ,
√
µ+ δ)-
resilient and that has constant statistical distance from the uniform distribution. This
type of resilience essentially guarantees security only for sets of constant density. In-
deed, their protocol allows the cheating party to bias the output distribution so that a
particular string has a constant probability of being the output. Hence, their protocol
only guarantees constant min-entropy and entropy (1 − )n for  > 0. Sanghvi and
Vadhan also show a lower bound Ω(log∗ n) on the number of rounds of any random
selection protocol that achieves constant statistical distance from the uniform distribu-
tion. We show that entropy n−O(1) implies being close to uniform distribution so the
lower bound translates to our protocols.
Recently, Gradwohl et al. [4], who also considered protocols with more than 2 play-
ers, constructed for each µ a O(log∗ n)-round protocol that is (µ,O(
√
µ))-resilient and
that uses linear communication. Our results are not completely comparable with those
of [4]; the protocols of [4] only achieve entropy n − O(log n) whereas the entropy
n − O(1) of our protocol implies only (µ,O(1/ log(1/µ)))-resilience for all µ > 0.
Their (1/n2, O(1/n))-resilient protocol, non-explicit matches our non-explicit protocol
from Section 4.1 in terms of entropy but our protocol can be extended to also achieve
high (n/2−O(log n)) min-entropy at the cost of additional 3 rounds.
This extensibility comes from the fact that all our protocols are asymmetric. When
Bob is honest (and Alice dishonest) the min-entropy of the output is guaranteed to be as
high as n−O(log n), which implies, by the aforementioned result of Kitaev [2] that the
min-entropy is only O(log n) when Bob is dishonest (and Alice honest). The protocols
of Gradwohl et al. in general do not have this feature. Whenever their protocols achieve
high (n−O(log n)) entropy the min-entropy is only O(log n).
Finally our explicit geometric protocol only obtains 3n/4 entropy and thus per-
forms worse than the explicit protocol from [4], that achieves for µ = 1/ log n entropy
n− o(n). Our explicit protocols though still have min-entropy n/2−O(log n) outper-
forming [4], that only gets min-entropy O(log n).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the notion of en-
tropy and of other measures of randomness, and we establish some relationships among
them. Section 3 contains our protocol that achieves entropy n−O(1). In Section 4 we
address the problem of reducing the communication complexity of our protocols. Due
to space limitations we omit almost all the proofs from this extended abstract.
2 Preliminaries




Pr[Y = s] · log Pr[Y = s].
If for some s ∈ S, Pr[Y = s] = 0 then the corresponding term in the sum is considered
to be zero. All logarithms are based two.
Let X,Y be (possibly dependent) jointly distributed random variable with ranges




Pr[X = t]H(Y|X = t),
where Y|X = t stands for the random variable whose range is S and which takes
outcome s ∈ S with probability Pr[Y = s|X = t].
The following are basic facts about the entropy:
H(f(Y)) ≤ H(Y) for any function f , (1)
H(Y) ≤ log |S|, (2)
H(Y|X) ≤ H(Y), (3)
H(〈X,Y〉) = H(Y|X) +H(X), (4)
H(X) ≤ H(〈Y,X〉) (follows from (4)), (5)
H(〈Y,X〉) ≤ H(Y) +H(X) (follows from (3) and (4)). (6)
Here 〈Y,X〉 stands for the random variable with range S×T , which takes the outcome
〈s, t〉 with probability Pr[X = t,Y = s]. We will abbreviate H(〈Y,X〉) as H(Y,X)
in the sequel.
The following corollaries of these facts are used in the sequel
1. Let Yi be random variables with the same range S and letY be obtained by picking
an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random and then drawing a random sam-
ple according to Yi. Then H(Y) ≥ 1n
∑n
i=1H(Yi). (Indeed, let X stand for the





2. Let ` ≥ 1 be an integer and f : S → T be a function from a set S to a set
T . Let Y be a random variable with range S. If ∀t ∈ T , |f−1(t)| ≤ ` then
H(f(Y)) ≥ H(Y) − log `. (Indeed, let X be the index of Y in f−1(Y). Then
H(Y) = H(f(Y),X) ≤ H(f(Y)) +H(X) ≤ H(f(Y)) + log `).
The min-entropy of a random variableX with a finite range S is
H∞(X) = min{− log Pr[X = s] : s ∈ S} .
The statistical distance between random variables X,Y with the same finite range
S is defined as the maximum
|Pr[X ∈ A]− Pr[Y ∈ A]|
over all subsets A of S. It is easy to see that the maximum is attained for A consisting
of all s with Pr[X = s] > Pr[Y = s] (as well as for its complement). For every integer
n ≥ 1, we denote byUn the uniform probability distribution of strings {0, 1}n.
In order to apply a lower-bound from [8] to show that our main protocol needs
Ω(log∗ n) rounds we establish a relation between entropy and constant statistical dis-
tance.
Lemma 1. For every real c there is a real q < 1 such that the following holds. If X is
a random variable with range {0, 1}n and H(X) ≥ n− c then the statistical distance
ofX andUn is at most q.
Definition. Let r, n be natural numbers. A deterministic strategy of a player (Alice
or Bob) is a function that maps each tuple 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 of binary strings where i < r to
a binary string (the current message of the player provided 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 is the sequence
of previous messages). A randomized strategy of a player (Alice or Bob) is a probability
distribution over deterministic strategies.
A protocol running in r rounds is a function f that maps each r-tuple 〈x1, . . . , xr〉
of binary strings to a binary string of length n (the first string x1 is considered as Alice’s
message, the second string x2 as Bob’s message and so on) and a pair 〈SA,SB〉 of
randomized strategies.
If SA, SB are deterministic strategies of Alice and Bob then the outcome of the pro-
tocol for SA, SB is defined as f(x1, . . . , xr) where x1, . . . , xr are defined recursively:
x2i+1 = SA(〈x1, . . . , x2i〉) and x2i+2 = SB(〈x1, . . . , x2i+1〉).
If SA,SB are randomized strategies of Alice and Bob then the outcome of the pro-
tocol is a random variable generated as follows: select independently Alice’s and Bob’s
strategies SA, SB with respect to probability distributions SA and SB , respectively, and
output the result of the protocol for SA, SB .
We say that Alice follows the protocol (is honest) if she uses the strategy SA. We say
that Alice deviates from the protocol (cheats) if she uses any other randomized strategy.
Similarly for Bob.
We say that a protocol P for random string selection is (k, l)-good if the following
properties hold:
1. If both Alice and Bob follow the protocol then the outcome is a fully random string
of length n.
2. If Alice follows the protocol and Bob deviates from it then the outcome has entropy
at least k.
3. If Bob follows the protocol and Alice deviates from it then the outcome has entropy
at least l.
(End of Definition.)
Throughout the paper we use the following easy observation that holds for every
protocol:
Lemma 2. Assume that Alice’s strategy SA guarantees that the entropy of the outcome
is at least α for all deterministic strategies of Bob. Then the same guarantee holds for
all randomized strategies of Bob as well. A similar statement is true for min-entropy in
place of entropy.
In [8], Sanghvi and Vadhan establish that any protocol for random selection that
guarantees a constant statistical distance of the output from the uniform distribution
requires at least Ω(log∗ n) rounds. Hence we obtain the following corollary to the pre-
vious lemma.
Corollary 1. If P is a protocol that is (n−O(1), n−O(1))-good then P has at least
Ω(log∗ n) rounds.
For µ,  > 0, a random string selection protocol P is (µ, )-resilient if for any set S
of size at most µ2n, the probability that the output of P is in S is at most , even if one
of the parties cheats.
In order to compare our results with previous work we state the following claim.
Lemma 3. For a random selection protocol P the following holds.
1. If P is (µ, dµc)-resilient for some constants c, d > 0 and any µ > 0 then P is
(n−O(1), n−O(1))-good.
2. If P is (n − O(1), n − O(1))-good then for some constant d and any µ > 0 it is
(µ, d/ log(1/µ)))-resilient.
3 The main protocol
In this section we construct a protocol that is (n−O(1), n−O(1))-good. We start with
the following protocol.
Lemma 4. There is a (n − 1, n − log n)-good protocol P0 running in 3 rounds and
communicating n2 + n + log n bits. If Bob is honest then the outcome of P0 has min-
entropy at least n− log n.
Proof. The protocol P0(A,B) is as follows:
1. Player A picks x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random and sends them to
Player B.
2. Player B picks y ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random and sends it to Player A.
3. Player A picks an index j ∈ {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random and sends it to B.
4. The outcomeR of the protocol is xj ⊕ y, i.e., the bit-wise xor of xj and y.
Note that the entropy bounds are tight as a cheating Bob can set y = x1 in the
protocol and thenH(R) = n− 1. Similarly, a cheating Alice can enforce the first log n
bits of the outcome to be all zero bits so H(R) = n− log n in that case.
1) It is easy to verify that the outcome R of the protocol P0(Alice,Bob) is uni-
formly distributed if both Alice and Bob follow the protocol and hence it has entropy
n.
2) Assume that Alice follows the protocol and Bob is trying to cheat. Hence, Alice
picks uniformly at random x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n. Bob picks y. Then Alice picks a
random index j ∈ {1, . . . n} and they set R = xj ⊕ y. Clearly, H(x1, . . . , xn) = n2,
thus
n2 = H(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ H(x1, . . . , xn, y) ≤ H(x1 ⊕ y, . . . , xn ⊕ y) +H(y)
≤ H(x1 ⊕ y, . . . , xn ⊕ y) + n.
Here the first inequality holds by (5), the middle one by (1) and (6), and the last one by
(2). Therefore,
(n2−n)/n ≤ H(x1⊕y, . . . , xn⊕y)/n ≤
n∑
i=1
H(xi⊕y)/n = H(xj⊕y|j) ≤ H(xj⊕y).
Here the second inequality holds by (6), the equality holds, as Alice chooses j uni-
formly, and the last inequality is true by (3).
3) Assume that Bob follows the protocol and Alice is trying to cheat. Hence, Alice
carefully selects x1, . . . , xn, Bob picks a random string y ∈ {0, 1}n and Alice carefully
chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus H(y|〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = n and hence
H(xj ⊕ y) ≥ H(xj ⊕ y|〈x1, . . . , xn〉) ≥ H(y|〈x1, . . . , xn〉)−H(j|〈x1, . . . , xn〉)
≥ H(y|〈x1, . . . , xn〉)−H(j) ≥ n− log n.
Here the second inequality holds by (1) and (6). Verifying the lower bound on the min-
entropy is straightforward.
Our protocol achieves our goal of having entropy of the outcome close to n if Alice
is honest. However if she is dishonest she can fix up-to log n bits of the outcome to
her will. Clearly, Alice’s cheating power comes from the fact that she can choose up-to
log n bits in the last round of the protocol. If we would reduce the number of strings
xj she can choose from in the last round, her cheating ability would decrease as well.
Unfortunately, that would increase cheating ability of Bob. Hence, there is a trade-off
between cheating ability of Alice and Bob. To overcome this we will reduce the number
of strings Alice can choose from but at the same time we will also limit Bob’s cheating
ability by replacing his y by an outcome of yet another run of the protocol played
with Alice’s and Bob’s roles reversed. By iterating this several times we can obtain the
following protocol.
Let log∗ n stand for the number of times we can apply the function dlog xe until we
get 1 from n. For instance, log∗ 100 = 4.
Theorem 1. There is a (n−2, n−3)-good protocol running in 2 log∗ n+1 rounds and
communicating n2 + O(n log n) bits. Depending on n, either if Alice or Bob is honest
then the min-entropy of the protocol is at least n−O(log n).
Proof. Let k = log∗ n − 1. Define `0 = n and `i = dlog `i−1e, for i = 1, . . . , k, so
`k−1 ∈ {3, 4} and `k = 2.
For i = 1, . . . , k we define protocol Pi(A,B) as follows.
1. Player A picks x1, x2, . . . , x`i ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random and sends them to
Player B.
2. Players A and B now run protocol Pi−1(B,A) (note that players exchange their
roles) and set y to the outcome of that protocol.
3. Player A picks an index j ∈ {1, . . . , `i} uniformly at random and sends it to B.
4. The outcomeRi of this protocol is xj ⊕ y.
We claim that the protocols are (n− 2, n− log 4`i)-good:
Lemma 5. For all i = 0, 1, . . . , k the following is true.
1. If both Alice and Bob follow the protocol Pi(Alice,Bob) then its outcome Ri sat-
isfies H(Ri) = n.
2. If Alice follows the protocolPi(Alice,Bob) then the outcomeRi satisfiesH(Ri) ≥
n− 2.
3. If Bob follows the protocol Pi(Alice,Bob) then the outcome Ri of the protocol
satisfies H(Ri) ≥ n− log 4`i.
All the bounds on the entropy are valid also when conditioned on the tuple consisting of
all strings communicated before running Pi. Furthermore, if i is even and Bob is honest
or i is odd and Alice is honest then H∞(Ri) ≥ n−
∑i+1
j=1 `j .
Proof. The first claim is straightforward to verify. We prove the other two simultane-
ously by an induction on i. For i = 0 the claims follow from Lemma 4. So assume that
the claims are true for i− 1 and we will prove them for i.
If Alice follows the protocol Pi(Alice,Bob) then she picks x1, . . . , x`i uniformly
at random. Then the protocol Pi−1(Bob,Alice) is invoked to obtain y = Ri−1. We
can reason just as in the proof of Lemma 4. However this time we have a better lower
bound for H(x1, . . . , x`i , y). Indeed, by induction hypothesis, since Alice follows the
protocol,
H(y|x1, . . . , x`i) ≥ n− log 4`i−1 ≥ n− 2`i.
Here the last inequality holds for all i < k as `i−1 > 4 in this case and hence 2`i ≥
2 log `i−1 > log 4`i−1. For i = k we have `i−1 ∈ {3, 4} and `i = 2 and the inequality
is evident.
Thus,
H(x1, . . . , x`i , y) = H(x1, . . . , x`i) +H(y|x1, . . . , x`i) ≥ `in− 2`i + n.
Just as in Lemma 4, this implies




≥ (H(x1, . . . , x`i , y)−H(y))/`i ≥ (`in− 2`i + n− n)/`i = n− 2.
Assume that Bob follows the protocol Pi(Alice,Bob) but Alice deviates from it by
carefully choosing x1, . . . , x`i and j. Then the protocol Pi−1(Bob,Alice) is invoked
to obtain y = Ri−1. By induction hypothesis H(y|x1, . . . , x`i) ≥ n − 2. Now Alice
chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , `i}. Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 4, we have
H(xj ⊕ y) ≥ H(xj ⊕ y|〈x1, . . . , x`i〉) ≥ H(y|〈x1, . . . , x`i〉)−H(j|〈x1, . . . , x`i〉)
≥ H(y|〈x1, . . . , x`i〉)−H(j) ≥ n− 2− log `i.
The claim about min-entropy follows by induction.
By the lemma, the protocol Pk is (n−2, n−3) good. It runs in 2k+3 = 2(log∗ n−
1) + 3 rounds.
The number of communicated bits is equal to
n2 + n+ log n+
k∑
i=1
(n`i + log `i)
All `i’s in the sum are at most log n and decrease faster than a geometric progression.
Hence the sum is at most its largest term (n log n) times a constant.
4 Improving communication complexity
In the previous section we have shown a protocol for Alice and Bob that guarantees that
the entropy of the selected string is at least n−O(1). The protocol has an optimal (up-to
a constant factor) number of rounds and communicates O(n2) bits. In this section we
will address the possibility of reducing the amount of communication in the protocol.
We focus on the basic protocol P0(A,B) as that protocol contributes to the com-
munication the most. The protocol can be viewed as follows.
1. Player A picks x ∈ {0, 1}mA uniformly at random and sends it to Player B.
2. Player B picks y ∈ {0, 1}mB uniformly at random and sends it to Player A.
3. Player A picks an index j ∈ {0, 1}m′A uniformly at random and sends it to B.
4. A fixed function f : {0, 1}mA ×{0, 1}mB ×{0, 1}m′A → {0, 1}n is applied to x, y
and j to obtain the outcome f(x, y, j).
We will denote such a protocol by P0(A,B, f). In the basic protocol the parameters
are: mA = n2, mB = n and m′A = log n. We would like to find another suitable
function f with a smaller domain.
We note first that three rounds in the protocol are necessary in order to obtain the
required guarantees on the output of the protocol. In any two round protocol at least one
of the parties can force the output to have entropy at most n/2 + O(log n). (In a two
round protocol, if for some x, the range of f(x, ·) is smaller than n2n/2 then Alice can
enforce entropy n/2 + log n by picking this x. On the other hand if f(x, ·) has a large
range for all x, then Bob can cheat by almost always enforcing the output to lie in a set
of size 2n/2. Bob’s cheating set can be picked at random.)
4.1 Non-explicit protocol
The following claim indicates that finding a suitable function f should be feasible.
Lemma 6. If f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}8 logn → {0, 1}n is taken uniformly at
random among all functions then with probability at least 1/2, P0(A,B, f) satisfies:
1. If both Alice and Bob follow the protocol P0(Alice,Bob, f) then its outcome R
satisfies H(R) = n−O(1).
2. If Alice follows the protocolP0(Alice,Bob, f) then the outcomeR satisfiesH(R) ≥
n−O(1).
3. If Bob follows the protocol P0(Alice,Bob, f) then the outcome R of the protocol
satisfies H(R) ≥ n−O(log n) and H∞(R) ≥ n−O(log n).
The question is how to find an explicit function f of similar properties. We propose
the following three functions that we believe have the required properties. We prove
several results in that direction.
1. frot : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {1, . . . , n} → {0, 1}n defined by f(x, y, j) = xj ⊕
y, where xj is the j-th rotation of x, xj = xjxj+1 · · ·xnx1 · · ·xj−1. Here n is
assumed to be a prime.
2. flin : F k−1×F k×F → F k, where F = GF [2logn], k = n/ log n and f(d, y, j) =
(1, d1, . . . , dk−1) ∗ j + (y1, . . . , yk).
3. fmul : F × F ×H → F , where F = GF [2n], H ⊆ F , |H| = n, and f(x, y, j) =
x ∗ j + y.
In particular the function frot is interesting as it would allow very efficient im-
plementation. We conjecture that for f ∈ {frot, flin, fmul} protocol P0(A,B, f) is
(n− o(n), n−O(log n))-good.
Lemma 7. P0(A,B, frot) is (n/2 − 3/2, n − log n)-good when n is prime and the
min-entropy of the outcome is at least n−O(log n) when Bob follows the protocol.
A similar lemma holds also for our other two candidate functions.
Averaging the asymmetry One of the interesting features of our protocols is the asym-
metry of cheating power of the two parties. We used this asymmetry to build the pro-
tocol with entropy n − O(1). One can also use this asymmetry for “averaging” their
cheating powers in the following simple way. Given a protocol Qn(A,B) for selecting
an n bit string, Alice and Bob first select the first n/2 bits of the string by running
the protocol Qn/2(Alice,Bob) and then they select the other half of the string by run-
ning the protocol Qn/2(Bob,Alice). If the protocol Qn is (k(n), l(n))-good then the
averaging protocol is (k(n/2) + l(n/2), k(n/2) + l(n/2))-good. Similarly if the min-
entropy when Alice follows the protocol is bounded from below by k∞(n) and when
Bob follows the protocol by l∞(n), then the min-entropy of the outcome of the averag-
ing protocol is at least k∞(n/2) + l∞(n/2).
Hence from Lemma 7 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. There is a 5-round protocol for random string selection that communi-
cates 2n + O(log n) bits, that is (3n/4 − O(log n), 3n/4 − O(log n))-good and that
has min-entropy at least n/2 − O(log n) when at least one of the parties follows the
protocol.
In the next section we show for a variant of P0(A,B, flin) a similar security guar-
antee.
4.2 Geometric protocols and the problem of Kakeya
We exhibit here a variant of the protocol P0(A,B, flin) and show that it achieves en-
tropy at least 3n/4 − O(1) if at least one party is honest. Fix a finite field F and a
naturalm ≥ 2. Let q = |F |. We rephrase the protocol as follows:
1. Alice picks at random a vector d = (1, d2, . . . , dm) ∈ Fm and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob picks at random x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Fm and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice picks at random t ∈ F and sends it to Bob.
4. The output of the protocol is
y = x+ td = (x1 + t, x2 + td2, . . . , xm + tdm).
The geometric meaning of the protocol is as follows. Alice picks at random a direc-
tion of an affine line in the m-dimensional space Fm over F . Bob chooses a random
affine line going in that direction. Alice outputs a random point lying on the line.
It is easy to lower bound the entropy of the output y of this protocol assuming that
Bob is honest.
Lemma 8. If Bob is honest then the outcome y of the protocol satisfies
H(y) ≥ H∞(y) ≥ (m− 1) log q.
Note that Alice can cheat this much. For example, Alice can force y1 = 0 by choosing
always t = −x1.
In the case when Alice is honest we are able to prove the bound H(y) ≥ (m/2 +
1) log q−O(1). We do not know whether Bob indeed can cheat this much. This question
is related to the following problem known as Kakeya problem for finite fields.
Kakeya problem. Let L be a collection of affine lines in Fm such that for each
direction there is exactly one line in L going in that direction. Let PL denote points in
lines from L. How small can be |PL|?
For a family L of lines let XL denote the random variable in PL that is a random
point on a random line in L. That is, to generate an outcome of XL, we pick a random
line ` in L (all the lines are equiprobable) and then pick a random point on ` (all the
points on ` are equiprobable).
Call any set of lines L satisfying the conditions of Kakeya problem a Kakeya fam-
ily and let H(m, q) stand for the minimum H(XL) over all Kakeya families L. Let
H∞(m, q) stand for the similar value for min-entropy.
Lemma 9. Assume that Alice is honest. Then the outcome of the protocol always satis-
fiesH(y) ≥ H(m, q) and there is Bob’s strategy such thatH(y) = H(m, q). The same
is true for min-entropy in place of entropy.
Proof. LetYS stand for the outcome of the protocol provided Bob uses a deterministic
strategy S. There is an onto function S 7→ L from deterministic Bob’s strategies to
Kakeya sets such thatXL coincides withYS .
Indeed, assume that Bob uses a deterministic strategy S. That is, for each d =
(1, d2, . . . , dm) Bob chooses x = x(d) deterministically. Thus Bob defines a Kakeya
family L consisting of all lines of the form
{x(d) + td | t ∈ F}.
ObviouslyXL = YS .
Conversely, for every Kakeya set L there is Bob’s strategy S mapped by this func-
tion to L (choose any point in the line in L going in direction d specified by Alice).
This implies the statement of the lemma for deterministic strategies. For randomized
strategies it follows from Lemma 2.
Note that for every family of lines L we have H(YL) ≤ log |PL|. Thus to prove
that the entropy of the outcome is at least α (provided Alice is honest) we need to
show the lower bound |PL| ≥ 2α for Kakeya problem. The best known lower bound
for |PL| is Ω(qm/2+1) [6, 5] (and it is conjectured that |PL| must be close to qm).
Note that this bound does not immediately imply that H(YL) ≥ (m/2 + 1) log q for
every Kakeya set L, as the entropy of a random variable can be much less than the
log-cardinality of the set of outcomes. However, the key proposition from the proof of
the bound |PL| = Ω(qm/2+1) presented in [5] indeed allows to prove a slightly weaker
inequality H(YL) ≥ (m/2 + 1) log q −O(1).
Proposition 1 ([5]). Let L be a collection of affine lines in Fm such that every 2-
dimensional plane has at most q + 1 lines from L. Let P be a subset of Fm. Then
|{(p, l) | l ∈ L, p ∈ P, p ∈ l}| ≤ C · (|P |1/2|L|3/4|F |1/4 + |P |+ |L|)
for some constant C.
This proposition allows to prove the following
Theorem 2. If Alice is honest then the outcome of the geometric protocol satisfies
H(y) ≥ (m/2+1) log q−O(1) andH∞(y) ≥ log q provided thatm2 log2 q/q ∈ O(1).
Proof. The second statement is obvious. Let us prove the first one. By Lemma 9 it
suffices to show that H(XL) ≥ (m/2 + 1) log q −O(1) for every Kakeya family L.
Let α stand for q−m/2−1c where c ≥ 1 is a constant to be defined later. We will
show that H(XL) ≥ − logα − O(1). For each y ∈ PL let py stand for the probability
that XL = y: that is, py is equal to the number of lines in L containing y divided by
qm. We classify y’s according to the value of py as follows.
Let Q denote the set of those y ∈ PL with
py ≤ α
and Si for i = 1, 2, . . . ,− logα the set of those y ∈ PL with
α2i−1 < py ≤ α2i.
The entropy ofXL is the average value of − log py . For all y in Q we have − log py ≥
− logα. For all y in Si we have − log py ≥ − logα − i. Thus H(XL) can be lower
bounded by











i · |Si| · α2i.
Thus we need to show that ∑
i
i · |Si| · α2i = O(1). (7)
To this end we need to upper bound |Si|. We are able to show the following bound.




−i converges and q−1 · (− log2 α) ∈ O(1) these bounds obviously
imply (7).
Proof. Note that every 2-dimensional plane has at most q+1 lines from L (the number
of different directions in every plane is equal to q + 1). Apply Proposition 1 to L and
P = Si. We obtain
|{(p, l) | l ∈ L, p ∈ Si, p ∈ l}| ≤ C · (|Si|1/2|L|3/4q1/4 + |Si|+ |L|)
= C · (|Si|1/2q(3m−2)/4 + |Si|+ qm−1).
Every point in Si belongs to more than α2i−1qm lines in L hence
|{(p, l) | l ∈ L, p ∈ Si, p ∈ l}| > |Si|α2i−1qm.
Combining the inequalities we obtain
|Si|α2iqm < C · (|Si|1/2q(3m−2)/4 + |Si|+ qm−1).
If the last term in the right hand side is greater than the other ones, we have
|Si|α2i < 3C · q−1.
If the second term in the right hand side is greater than the other ones, we have
α2iqm < 3C.
Note that, since m ≥ 2, i ≥ 1, we have α2iqm = 2icqm/2−1 ≥ 2c. Therefore this
cannot be the case, if we let c ≥ 1.5C.
In the remaining case (the first term in the right hand side is greater than the other
ones) we have
|Si|1/2 < 3C2−iα−1q−m/4−1/2 ⇒ |Si| < 9C22−2iα−2q−m/2−1,
and
|Si|α2i < 9C22−iα−1q−m/2−1 = 9C22−i.
The last equality holds by the choice of α. Therefore,
|Si|α2i ≤ 9C22−i.
If we choosem = 4 then the lower bounds forH(y) in the cases when Alice cheats
and Bob cheats coincide and are equal to 3 log q −O(1). Thus we get:
Theorem 3. There is a (3n/4−O(1), 3n/4−O(1))-good 3-round protocol that com-
municates 2n bits.
Using averaging we obtain the following corollary:
Theorem 4. There is a (3n/4−O(1), 3n/4−O(1))-good 6-round protocol that com-
municates 2n bits and guarantees the min-entropy at least n/2−O(1) for both players.
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